链路泛滥攻击与流量工程的相互影响
On the Interplay of Link-Flooding Attacks and Traffic Engineering
摘要：
链接泛滥攻击甚至有可能切断整个国家与互联网的连接。此外，新提出的间接链接洪水攻击，如“交叉火力”，是非常难以暴露，随后，有效地减轻。流量工程（TE）是网络缓解链路过载事件、平衡负载和恢复连接的自然方式。这项工作提出了一个问题：我们是否也需要一种新的TE来揭露攻击？关键的想法是，一个精心制作的，攻击感知的TE可以迫使攻击者遵循不可能的流量模式，随着时间的推移暴露他的目标和他的身份。我们表明，现有的和新的TE模块可以有效地暴露攻击，并研究每种方法的好处。我们使用模拟机制实现防御原型，并在多个真实拓扑结构上对其进行广泛评估。
英文摘要：
Link-flooding attacks have the potential to disconnect even entire countries from the Internet. Moreover, newly proposed indirect link-flooding attacks, such as 'Crossfire', are extremely hard to expose and, subsequently, mitigate effectively. Traffic Engineering (TE) is the network's natural way of mitigating link overload events, balancing the load and restoring connectivity. This work poses the question: Do we need a new kind of TE to expose an attack as well? The key idea is that a carefully crafted, attack-aware TE could force the attacker to follow improbable traffic patterns, revealing his target and his identity over time. We show that both existing and novel TE modules can efficiently expose the attack, and study the benefits of each approach. We implement defense prototypes using simulation mechanisms and evaluate them extensively on multiple real topologies.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
