arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1611.01477cs.CR
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在Android上使用Hover来降低用户输入的机密性

Using Hover to Compromise the Confidentiality of User Input on Android

Enis Ulqinaku, Luka Malisa, Julinda Stefa, Alessandro Mei, Srdjan Capkun

摘要:

我们表明,新的悬停(浮动触摸)技术,可在今天的智能手机型号,可以被滥用的任何Android应用程序运行一个共同的系统_ALERT_WINDOWS权限记录到其他应用程序的所有触摸屏输入。利用这种攻击,在系统上运行的恶意应用程序因此能够分析用户的行为,捕获密码和PIN等敏感输入,并记录所有用户的社交互动。为了评估我们的攻击,我们实现了Hoover,这是一个概念验证的恶意应用程序,它在系统后台运行,并记录前台应用程序的所有输入。我们对Hoover进行了评估,有40名用户,使用两种不同的Android设备和两种输入方法,手写笔和手指。在触摸屏上用手指输入的情况下,胡佛估计用户点击的位置误差在100像素以内,键盘输入的准确率为79%。Hoover更准确地捕捉用户的手写笔输入,估计用户的点击在2像素以内,键盘输入的准确率达到98%。我们讨论了减轻这种攻击的方法,并表明这不能通过简单地限制访问权限或对用户施加额外的认知负荷来实现,因为这将大大限制悬停技术的预期用途。

英文摘要:

We show that the new hover (floating touch) technology, available in a number of today's smartphone models, can be abused by any Android application running with a common SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to record all touchscreen input into other applications. Leveraging this attack, a malicious application running on the system is therefore able to profile user's behavior, capture sensitive input such as passwords and PINs as well as record all user's social interactions. To evaluate our attack we implemented Hoover, a proof-of-concept malicious application that runs in the system background and records all input to foreground applications. We evaluated Hoover with 40 users, across two different Android devices and two input methods, stylus and finger. In the case of touchscreen input by finger, Hoover estimated the positions of users' clicks within an error of 100 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 79%. Hoover captured users' input by stylus even more accurately, estimating users' clicks within 2 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 98%. We discuss ways of mitigating this attack and show that this cannot be done by simply restricting access to permissions or imposing additional cognitive load on the users since this would significantly constrain the intended use of the hover technology.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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