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arXiv 1610.08322physics.soc-phhep-exphysics.hist-ph
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机构与科学实验风险

Agencies and Science-Experiment Risk

Eric E. Johnson

摘要:

奇怪的是,美国政府机构在进行具有潜在风险的科学研究时缺乏法律约束。其中一些活动可能会造成数百万人死亡,甚至摧毁地球。现行法律让行政机关自行决定其活动是否在可接受的风险范围内。本文探讨了在何种程度上以及在何种情况下,法律应当允许私人对这种非监管机构的努力提起诉讼。参与这一问题不仅本身很有趣,它还使我们能够检验行政机关能力和法院作用的基本概念。两个案例研究为讨论提供了基础:美国宇航局在航天器上使用钚电源,批评者说这可能会在大气解体的情况下导致数百万人患上癌症,以及能源部的粒子对撞机实验(RHIC,或相对论重离子对撞机),据称会造成地球崩溃的小风险(通过“杀手奇异夸克”)。这些极端的例子可以作为新古典经济学、行为经济学、风险管理研究和认知心理学的试验平台。由此产生的分析表明,在低概率/高危害的情况下,机构可能会做一个穷人的工作,判断风险的可接受性,以公众。相反,在普通法脉络中工作的通才法官可能有令人惊讶的优势。这反过来又表明,在某些情况下,政府应该受到法律行动的约束,这种法律行动对非管制性质的自由裁量机构行动提供了不尊重的审查。

英文摘要:

There is a curious absence of legal constraints on U.S. government agencies undertaking potentially risky scientific research. Some of these activities may present a risk of killing millions or even destroying the planet. Current law leaves it to agencies to decide for themselves whether their activities fall within the bounds of acceptable risk. This Article explores to what extent and under what circumstances the law ought to allow private actions against such non-regulatory agency endeavors. Engaging with this issue is not only interesting in its own right, it allows us to test fundamental concepts of agency competence and the role of the courts. Two case studies provide a foundation for discussion: NASA's use of plutonium power supplies on spacecraft, which critics say could cause millions of cancers in the event of atmospheric disintegration, and a Department of Energy particle-collider experiment (the RHIC, or Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider) that allegedly poses a small risk of collapsing the Earth (via a "killer strangelet"). These extreme examples serve as a test-bed for applying insights from neoclassical economics, behavioral economics, risk-management studies, and cognitive psychology. The resulting analysis suggests that in low-probability/high-harm scenarios, agencies are likely to do a poor job of judging the acceptability of risk to the public. Instead, generalist judges working in a common-law vein may have surprising advantages. This in turns suggests that under certain circumstances the government should be subject to legal action that provides non-deferential review of discretionary agency actions that are non-regulatory in nature.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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