不透明声誉支持的伙伴选择促进合作行为
Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
AI总结：
本研究通过网络实验探究不透明声誉在有无伙伴选择时对合作行为的影响，发现低声誉是不可信信号，伙伴选择下不透明声誉能促使潜在背叛者转为合作者，为声誉特征及人类利用声誉的方式提供见解。
摘要：
声誉在人类社会中扮演重要角色，被认为是合作进化的一种解释。尽管多数先前研究将声誉等同于参与者过去决策的透明完整历史，但现实中声誉往往模糊且不透明。通过基于网络的实验，我们探究了在有和没有伙伴选择机会的情况下，不透明声誉在隔离背叛者方面的作用程度。结果显示，低声誉是不可信的信号，而参与者在选择时不会考虑中高声誉；无伙伴选择的声誉无法促进合作行为，即背叛者不会仅为获得积极声誉而转为合作者；在第三项研究中，当声誉对选择至关重要时，相当比例的潜在背叛者会转为合作者。这些结果为声誉的特征以及人类在选择伙伴和知晓自己将被选择时如何利用声誉提供了见解。
英文摘要：
Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players' past decisions, in real life, reputations are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. Our results show that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputation are not taken into account by participants for orienting their choices. We also find that reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, we find that, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights on the characteristics of reputation and on the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners but also when knowing that they will be selected.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
