arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 1609.00100cs.CRcs.OS
收藏

保护OS免受网络攻击的基于可疑污染的访问控制

Suspicious-Taint-Based Access Control for Protecting OS from Network Attacks

Zhiyong Shan

摘要:

目前,操作系统的安全威胁主要来自网络。单靠传统的自主访问控制机制很难击败它们。传统的强制访问控制模型虽然能有效地保护操作系统的安全,但存在与应用软件不兼容、管理复杂等问题。在本文中,我们提出了一个新的模型,可疑污点为基础的访问控制(STBAC)模型,抵御网络攻击,同时兼容性,简单,并保持良好的系统性能。STBAC将使用非可信通信的进程作为可疑污点的起点,通过污点规则跟踪可疑污点进程的活动,通过保护规则禁止可疑污点进程非法访问重要资源。即使在某些特权进程被破坏的情况下,STBAC仍然可以保护重要资源不被入侵者破坏。我们在Linux内核中实现了该模型,并通过实验对其进行了评估。评估表明,STBAC可以有效地保护重要资源,而不会对兼容性和性能产生重大影响。

英文摘要:

Today, security threats to operating systems largely come from network. Traditional discretionary access control mechanism alone can hardly defeat them. Although traditional mandatory access control models can effectively protect the security of OS, they have problems of being incompatible with application software and complex in administration. In this paper, we propose a new model, Suspicious-Taint-Based Access Control (STBAC) model, for defeating network attacks while being compatible, simple and maintaining good system performance. STBAC regards the processes using Non-Trustable-Communications as the starting points of suspicious taint, traces the activities of the suspiciously tainted processes by taint rules, and forbids the suspiciously tainted processes to illegally access vital resources by protection rules. Even in the cases when some privileged processes are subverted, STBAC can still protect vital resources from being compromised by the intruder. We implemented the model in the Linux kernel and evaluated it through experiments. The evaluation showed that STBAC could protect vital resources effectively without significant impact on compatibility and performance.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑