可见光通信网络中物理层攻击的可行性
The feasibility of launching physical layer attacks in visible light communication networks
摘要:
基于可见光通信(VLC)的无线网络被认为优于传统的基于无线电的通信的领域之一是安全性。总结VLC安全功能的常用口号是:WYSIWYS -“你所看到的就是你所发送的”。然而,特别是在基础设施下行链路通信的情况下,必须小心地提供关于数据窥探、干扰和修改的安全性。本文探讨VLC网络的物理层方面可能造成的破坏流氓发射机。我们提出的理论系统模型,我们在模拟中使用,以评估各种流氓传输的情况下,在一个典型的办公室环境。我们使用估计的比特出错率(BER)作为衡量干扰和流氓数据传输的有效性。我们发现,这是很容易破坏,在某些情况下,甚至劫持合法的传输。
英文摘要:
One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS - "What You See Is What You Send". However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。