DiskFiltration：通过隐藏的硬盘驱动器噪声从无扬声器的空气间隙计算机中泄漏数据
DiskFiltration: Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Hard Drive Noise
摘要：
气隙计算机在物理上和逻辑上与Internet断开连接。采取这一措施是为了防止敏感数据从安全网络泄漏。在过去，已经表明恶意软件可以通过计算机的扬声器传输超声波信号来从空气间隙的计算机中窃取数据。然而，这种声学通信依赖于计算机上扬声器的可用性。在本文中，我们提出了“过滤过滤”，一个隐蔽的通道，它有利于从空气间隙的计算机通过从其硬盘驱动器（HDD）发出的声学信号的数据泄漏。我们的方法是独特的，不像其他声学隐蔽通道，它不需要扬声器或音频硬件的存在下，在空气间隙的计算机。安装在受损机器上的恶意软件可以通过控制HDD的致动器臂的移动来生成特定音频频率的声发射。数字信息可以在声信号上调制，然后由附近的接收器（例如，智能电话、智能手表、膝上型计算机等）。我们研究硬盘解剖结构，并分析其声学特性。我们还提出了信号产生和检测，以及数据调制和解调算法。基于我们提出的方法，我们开发了一个发射机上的个人电脑和智能手机上的接收器，我们提供的设计和实现细节。我们还评估了我们的隐蔽通道上的各种类型的内部和外部硬盘在不同的计算机机箱和各种距离。通过过滤，我们能够秘密地传输数据（例如，密码、加密密钥和键盘记录数据）以180比特/分钟（10，800比特/小时）的有效比特率和高达两米（六英尺）的距离在空气间隙的计算机与智能手机之间传输。
英文摘要：
Air-gapped computers are disconnected from the Internet physically and logically. This measure is taken in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive data from secured networks. In the past, it has been shown that malware can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers by transmitting ultrasonic signals via the computer's speakers. However, such acoustic communication relies on the availability of speakers on a computer. In this paper, we present 'DiskFiltration,' a covert channel which facilitates the leakage of data from an air-gapped compute via acoustic signals emitted from its hard disk drive (HDD). Our method is unique in that, unlike other acoustic covert channels, it doesn't require the presence of speakers or audio hardware in the air-gapped computer. A malware installed on a compromised machine can generate acoustic emissions at specific audio frequencies by controlling the movements of the HDD's actuator arm. Digital Information can be modulated over the acoustic signals and then be picked up by a nearby receiver (e.g., smartphone, smartwatch, laptop, etc.). We examine the HDD anatomy and analyze its acoustical characteristics. We also present signal generation and detection, and data modulation and demodulation algorithms. Based on our proposed method, we developed a transmitter on a personal computer and a receiver on a smartphone, and we provide the design and implementation details. We also evaluate our covert channel on various types of internal and external HDDs in different computer chassis and at various distances. With DiskFiltration we were able to covertly transmit data (e.g., passwords, encryption keys, and keylogging data) between air-gapped computers to a smartphone at an effective bit rate of 180 bits/minute (10,800 bits/hour) and a distance of up to two meters (six feet).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
