使用RAND劫持将相互认证改进为GSM
Retrofitting mutual authentication to GSM using RAND hijacking
摘要:
正如已经广泛讨论的那样,GSM移动电话系统只提供移动电话对网络的单方面认证;这种限制允许一系列攻击。虽然增加对相互认证的支持将是非常有益的,但改变GSM服务网络的操作方式并不现实。本文提出了一种新的修改用户身份模块(SIM)和它的家庭网络之间的关系,允许相互认证,而不改变任何现有的移动基础设施,包括电话;唯一必要的变化是认证中心和SIM卡。这种增强可以以完全透明的方式逐个部署,不仅解决了GSM中的一些严重漏洞,而且也是第一个增强具有这种透明度属性的GSM认证的建议。
英文摘要:
As has been widely discussed, the GSM mobile telephony system only offers unilateral authentication of the mobile phone to the network; this limitation permits a range of attacks. While adding support for mutual authentication would be highly beneficial, changing the way GSM serving networks operate is not practical. This paper proposes a novel modification to the relationship between a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and its home network which allows mutual authentication without changing any of the existing mobile infrastructure, including the phones; the only necessary changes are to the authentication centres and the SIMs. This enhancement, which could be deployed piecemeal in a completely transparent way, not only addresses a number of serious vulnerabilities in GSM but is also the first proposal for enhancing GSM authentication that possesses such transparency properties.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。