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arXiv 1606.07760cs.CR
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基于Gabidulin码的Faure-Loidreau方案的多项式时间密钥恢复攻击

Polynomial-Time Key Recovery Attack on the Faure-Loidreau Scheme based on Gabidulin Codes

Philippe Gaborit, Ayoub Otmani, Hervé Talé Kalachi

摘要:

基于秩度量的加密方案导致几千字节量级的小公钥大小,这与基于汉明度量的加密方案相比代表了非常有吸引力的特征,在基于汉明度量的加密方案中,公钥大小是几十万字节量级,甚至具有像循环性的附加结构。在秩度量中构造公钥加密方案的主要工具是与Gabidulin码族一起使用的McEliece加密设置。自1991年Gabidulin,Paramonov和Tretjakov提出了最初的方案以来,已经提出了许多基于Gabidulin码的不同掩蔽技术的系统。然而,多年来,所有这些系统基本上都是通过使用Overbeck提出的攻击来攻击的。2005年,Faure和Loidreau设计了一个秩度量加密方案,该方案不在McEliece的设置中。该方案是非常有效的,与小的公钥大小为几千字节和安全性密切相关的线性多项式重建问题,对应于Gabidulin码的解码问题。该方案的结构与经典的McEliece设置有很大的不同,直到我们的工作,该方案从未被攻击过。在这篇文章中,我们表明,这个计划像其他计划的基础上Gabidulin码,也容易受到多项式时间攻击,恢复私钥通过应用Overbeck的攻击一个适当的公共代码。作为一个例子,我们打破了具体的建议$80$位安全参数在几秒钟内。

英文摘要:

Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of order of few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature compared to Hamming metric-based encryption schemes where public key sizes are of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with additional structures like the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in rank metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin codes. Since the original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov, many systems have been proposed based on different masking techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years all these systems were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck. In 2005 Faure and Loidreau designed a rank-metric encryption scheme which was not in the McEliece setting. The scheme is very efficient, with small public keys of size a few kiloBytes and with security closely related to the linearized polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decoding problem of Gabidulin codes. The structure of the scheme differs considerably from the classical McEliece setting and until our work, the scheme had never been attacked. We show in this article that this scheme like other schemes based on Gabidulin codes, is also vulnerable to a polynomial-time attack that recovers the private key by applying Overbeck's attack on an appropriate public code. As an example we break concrete proposed $80$ bits security parameters in a few seconds.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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