有限反馈下的竞争策略解决
Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedback
摘要:
本文从博弈论的角度研究了竞争解决协议。我们专注于\emph{acknowledgment-based}协议,其中用户仅在尝试传输时才从信道获得反馈。在这种情况下,她将了解她的传输是否成功。不发送的用户将不会收到任何反馈。我们感兴趣的是均衡协议,其中没有参与者有偏离的动机。有限反馈使得均衡协议的设计成为一项艰巨的任务,因为最佳响应策略通常必须建模为部分可观测马尔可夫决策过程,这是难以分析的。然而,我们展示了如何规避这两个球员的情况下,提出了一个均衡协议。对于许多球员,我们给出了不可能的结果,为一大类基于协议,即\emph{age-based}和\emph{backoff}协议有限的预期完成时间。最后,我们提出了一个基于年龄的均衡协议,该协议具有无限的期望完成时间,但每个参与人都以高概率在线性时间内完成。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on \emph{acknowledgment-based} protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or not. Users that do not transmit will not receive any feedback. We are interested in equilibrium protocols, where no player has an incentive to deviate. The limited feedback makes the design of equilibrium protocols a hard task as best response policies usually have to be modeled as Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes, which are hard to analyze. Nevertheless, we show how to circumvent this for the case of two players and present an equilibrium protocol. For many players, we give impossibility results for a large class of acknowledgment-based protocols, namely \emph{age-based} and \emph{backoff} protocols with finite expected finishing time. Finally, we provide an age-based equilibrium protocol, which has infinite expected finishing time, but every player finishes in linear time with high probability.
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