Tor中的无政府状态:去中心化的性能成本
Anarchy in Tor: Performance Cost of Decentralization
摘要:
像许多路由协议一样,Tor匿名网络具有分散的路径选择,在客户端本地独立选择路径。结果,网络资源可能被闲置,使系统处于次优状态。这被称为无政府状态的无政府代价,在这种情况下,从全球范围来看,为自己的利益行事的代理人可能会做出糟糕的决定。在本文中,我们探讨了Tor的无政府状态的成本,通过研究潜在的性能提高,可以通过集中优化电路和继电器选择使用全局知识。在离线和在线算法的实验中,我们表明,与传统Tor相比,集中协调的客户端可以实现高达75%的带宽。根据这些发现,我们设计并评估了我们在线算法的分散版本,其中中继在本地分发信息,使客户能够在本地做出更明智的决策,并以10-60%的速度执行下载。最后,我们对分散算法进行了隐私分析,以对抗被动和主动的对手,试图减少客户端的匿名性,并增加他们对Tor网络的看法。我们的结论是,这种分散式算法不会产生新的攻击,同时提供更高的性能。
英文摘要:
Like many routing protocols, the Tor anonymity network has decentralized path selection, in clients locally and independently choose paths. As a result, network resources may be left idle, leaving the system in a suboptimal state. This is referred to as the price of anarchy, where agents acting in their own self interest can make poor decisions when viewed in a global context. In this paper we explore the cost of anarchy in Tor by examining the potential performance increases that can be gained by centrally optimizing circuit and relay selection using global knowledge. In experiments with both offline and online algorithms, we show that centrally coordinated clients can achieve up to 75% higher bandwidth compared to traditional Tor. Drawing on these findings, we design and evaluate a decentralized version of our online algorithm, in which relays locally distribute information enabling clients to make smarter decisions locally and perform downloads 10-60% faster. Finally, we perform a privacy analysis of the decentralized algorithm against a passive and active adversary trying to reduce anonymity of clients and increase their view of the Tor network. We conclude that this decentralized algorithm does not enable new attacks, while providing significantly higher performance.
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