盲目的黑客攻击：对安全关键终端的（几乎）无形的恶意UI攻击
Hacking in the Blind: (Almost) Invisible Runtime UI Attacks on Safety-Critical Terminals
摘要：
许多终端用于安全关键操作中，其中人通过终端用户界面成为系统控制回路的一部分（例如，医疗和工业系统）。这些终端通常是嵌入式的，功能有限的单一用途设备，有时是气隙的，并且越来越坚固。我们描述了一种新的方式来攻击这样的终端，对手只有临时的，非侵入性的，物理访问终端。在这种攻击中，攻击者将一个小型设备连接到将用户输入外围设备连接到终端的接口。当授权用户执行安全关键操作时，设备通过修改或阻止用户输入或注入新的输入事件来执行攻击。假设攻击者可以访问用户输入，则执行此攻击可能看起来微不足道。然而，要成功，攻击者需要克服许多挑战，包括无法直接观察用户界面并避免被用户检测到。我们提出的技术，允许用户界面状态和输入跟踪。我们评估这些技术，并表明它们可以有效地实施。我们进一步评估我们的攻击的有效性，通过一个在线的用户研究，并找到输入修改攻击是很难为用户检测，因此会导致严重违反输入完整性。
英文摘要：
Many terminals are used in safety-critical operations in which humans, through terminal user interfaces, become a part of the system control loop (e.g., medical and industrial systems). These terminals are typically embedded, single-purpose devices with restricted functionality, sometimes air-gapped and increasingly hardened. We describe a new way of attacking such terminals in which an adversary has only temporary, non-invasive, physical access to the terminal. In this attack, the adversary attaches a small device to the interface that connects user input peripherals to the terminal. The device executes the attack when the authorized user is performing safety-critical operations, by modifying or blocking user input, or injecting new input events. Given that the attacker has access to user input, the execution of this attack might seem trivial. However, to succeed, the attacker needs to overcome a number of challenges including the inability to directly observe the user interface and avoid being detected by the users. We present techniques that allow user interface state and input tracking. We evaluate these techniques and show that they can be implemented efficiently. We further evaluate the effectiveness of our attack through an online user study and find input modification attacks that are hard for the users to detect and would therefore lead to serious violations of the input integrity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
