arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1604.03324cs.GTcs.NI
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在多信道认知无线电网络中减轻自私主用户模拟攻击:一个监视游戏

Mitigating selfish primary user emulation attacks in multi-channel cognitive radio networks: A surveillance game

Duc-Tuyen Ta, Nhan Nguyen-Thanh, Patrick Maille, Phillippe Ciblat, Van-Tam Nguyen

摘要:

主用户仿真攻击(PUEA)是认知无线电网络(CRN)中的一个严重安全问题,攻击者通过仿真主用户信号来限制用户在被攻击信道上的二次接入。执行PUEA以自私地占用更多信道的用户被称为自私PUEA攻击者。网络管理员可以对不允许的信道采取监视过程,以识别自私PUEA攻击者的非法信道占用,从而减轻自私PUEA。确定监视策略,特别是在多信道环境中,对于确保网络操作的公平性是必要的。在本文中,我们制定了一个游戏,称为多通道监视游戏,自私的攻击和监视过程中的多通道CRNs。采用序列形式表示法确定博弈的纳什均衡。我们表明,执行所获得的NE监视策略显着减轻自私的PUEA。

英文摘要:

Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA), in which attackers emulate primary user signals causing restriction of secondary access on the attacked channels, is a serious security problem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). An user performing a PUEA for selfishly occupying more channels is called a selfish PUEA attacker. Network managers could adopt a surveillance process on disallowed channels for identifying illegal channel occupation of selfish PUEA attackers and hence mitigating selfish PUEA. Determining surveillance strategies, particularly in multi-channel context, is necessary for ensuring network operation fairness. In this paper, we formulate a game, called multi-channel surveillance game, between the selfish attack and the surveillance process in multi-channel CRNs. The sequence-form representation method is adopted to determine the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We show that performing the obtained NE surveillance strategy significantly mitigates selfish PUEA.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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