通过时变货币奖励激励数据中心用户参与需求响应计划
Incentivizing Users of Data Centers Participate in The Demand Response Programs via Time-Varying Monetary Rewards
摘要:
需求响应被当今的数据中心广泛采用,以响应于电力成本的增加来减少能量消耗。为了激励数据中心的用户参与需求响应计划,即,打破“分裂激励”的障碍,一些先前的研究提出了基于市场的机制,如动态定价和静态货币奖励。然而,这些机制要么是侵扰性的,要么是不公平的。在本文中,我们使用时变奖励来激励用户,谁有灵活的最后期限,并愿意交易性能下降的货币奖励,授予他们的请求时移。通过博弈论框架,我们对单个数据中心与其用户之间的博弈进行了建模。此外,我们通过将其与其他两个新兴的实际需求响应策略相结合来扩展我们的设计:服务器关闭和本地可再生能源发电。与现实世界的数据跟踪,我们表明,DC与我们的设计可以有效地摆脱其峰值电力负荷和整体电力成本,而不会降低其利润,当它与目前的做法相比,没有建立激励机制。
英文摘要:
Demand response is widely employed by today's data centers to reduce energy consumption in response to the increasing of electricity cost. To incentivize users of data centers participate in the demand response programs, i.e., breaking the "split incentive" hurdle, some prior researches propose market-based mechanisms such as dynamic pricing and static monetary rewards. However, these mechanisms are either intrusive or unfair. In this paper, we use time-varying rewards to incentivize users, who have flexible deadlines and are willing to trading performance degradation for monetary rewards, grant time-shifting of their requests. With a game-theoretic framework, we model the game between a single data center and its users. Further, we extend our design via integrating it with two other emerging practical demand response strategies: server shutdown and local renewable energy generation. With real-world data traces, we show that a DC with our design can effectively shed its peak electricity load and overall electricity cost without reducing its profit, when comparing it with the current practice where no incentive mechanism is established.
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