观测还是不观测:用于城市停车的排队博弈框架
To Observe or Not to Observe: Queuing Game Framework for Urban Parking
AI总结:
本文通过排队博弈框架分析城市停车问题,比较纳什均衡与社会最优均衡,探讨在无需完全信息的情况下如何提升社会福利。
摘要:
我们将城市停车建模为一组并行队列,并叠加博弈论结构,以比较用户选择的纳什均衡与社会最优均衡。我们将到达的司机建模为效用最大化者,并考虑两种博弈:一种是观察队列长度免费,另一种是司机需付费观察队列长度。在两种博弈中,司机必须在退避或加入之间做出决策。我们比较纳什诱导的福利与社会最优福利。我们发现,福利的提升不需要完全信息渗透——意味着,为了提升社会福利,不需所有人支付观察费用。通过模拟,我们探索更复杂的场景,其中司机基于排队博弈决定是否进入网络中的队列集合。我们考察了占用与拥堵的关系,这对确定停车资源对整体交通拥堵的影响至关重要。我们的模拟模型使用了由西雅图交通部门收集的现实数据参数。
英文摘要:
We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash) equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as utility maximizers and consider the game in which observing the queue length is free as well as the game in which drivers must pay to observe the queue length. In both games, drivers must decide between balking and joining. We compare the Nash induced welfare to the socially optimal welfare. We find that gains to welfare do not require full information penetration---meaning, for social welfare to increase, not everyone needs to pay to observe. Through simulation, we explore a more complex scenario where drivers decide based the queueing game whether or not to enter a collection of queues over a network. We examine the occupancy-congestion relationship, an important relationship for determining the impact of parking resources on overall traffic congestion. Our simulated models use parameters informed by real-world data collected by the Seattle Department of Transportation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。