识别和描述Tor网络中的Sybils
Identifying and characterizing Sybils in the Tor network
摘要：
作为一个志愿者运行的分布式匿名网络，Tor很容易受到Sybil攻击。我们对Tor网络中真实世界的Sybil知之甚少，也缺乏实用的工具和方法来揭露Sybil攻击。在这项工作中，我们开发sybilhunter，第一个系统检测Sybil继电器的基础上，他们的外观，如配置和行为，如序列。我们使用sybilhunter的多样化分析技术来分析九年来存档的Tor网络数据，为我们提供了对现实世界攻击者操作的新见解。我们的发现包括各种各样的Sybils，从僵尸网络到学术研究，以及劫持比特币交易的中继。我们的工作表明，现有的Sybil防御不适用于Tor，它提供了对现实世界攻击的洞察，并提供了实用的工具来发现和描述Sybils，使网络对其用户更安全。
英文摘要：
Being a volunteer-run, distributed anonymity network, Tor is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Little is known about real-world Sybils in the Tor network, and we lack practical tools and methods to expose Sybil attacks. In this work, we develop sybilhunter, the first system for detecting Sybil relays based on their appearance, such as configuration; and behavior, such as uptime sequences. We used sybilhunter's diverse analysis techniques to analyze nine years of archived Tor network data, providing us with new insights into the operation of real-world attackers. Our findings include diverse Sybils, ranging from botnets, to academic research, and relays that hijack Bitcoin transactions. Our work shows that existing Sybil defenses do not apply to Tor, it delivers insights into real-world attacks, and provides practical tools to uncover and characterize Sybils, making the network safer for its users.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
