内容提供方与付费网络提供商的竞争：比中立更好？
Content Providers Volunteering to Pay Network Providers: Better than Neutrality?
摘要：
本文研究了施加网络中立性对用户福利的影响，使用基于双边市场框架的提供商互动的博弈论模型：我们假设平台-最后一英里接入提供商（ISP）-是竞争者，并考虑内容提供方（CP）的进入决策。所有的决定都会影响用户的选择，用户对CP和ISP的投资（分别在内容创建和服务质量方面）都很敏感。在非中立制度下，CP和ISP可以相互收费，而在中立制度下，这种收费是被禁止的。我们假设这些费用（如果有的话）是由CP选择的，这是文献中很少考虑的一个方向，在文献中它们被假设为由ISP固定。我们的分析表明，出乎意料的是，更多的CP进入市场的非中立制度，他们支付ISP，比没有这样的付款。此外，在这种情况下，互联网服务提供商往往比中立制度投资更多。从我们的研究结果来看，用户福利方面的最佳制度是参数依赖的，在设计中立性法规时需要谨慎。
英文摘要：
This paper studies the effects on user welfare of imposing network neutrality, using a game-theoretic model of provider interactions based on a two-sided market framework: we assume that the platform--the last-mile access providers (ISPs)--are monopolists, and consider content providers (CPs) entry decisions. All decisions affect the choices made by users, who are sensitive both to CP and ISP investments (in content creation and quality-of-service, respectively). In a non-neutral regime, CPs and ISPs can charge each other, while such charges are prohibited in the neutral regime. We assume those charges (if any) are chosen by CPs, a direction rarely considered in the literature, where they are assumed fixed by ISPs. Our analysis suggests that, unexpectedly, more CPs enter the market in a non-neutral regime where they pay ISPs, than without such payments. Additionally, in this case ISPs tend to invest more than in the neutral regime. From our results, the best regime in terms of user welfare is parameter dependent, calling for caution in designing neutrality regulations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
