开放多Agent系统中的分散范数监控
Decentralised Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems
摘要:
本文研究了开放多智能体系统(MAS)中规范违反的检测问题。我们展示了如何,使用的想法,从纸条系统,我们可以设计的机制,包括MAS的代理人的激励,以监测其他代理人的行为规范的违反。提供奖励的费用不由MAS承担,也不是来自违反规范的罚款(在代理人可以自由离开并以不同身份重新加入的系统中,罚款可能是不可能征收的)。相反,监督激励来自获得MAS提供的服务的(代币)费用。在某些情况下,可以实现完美的监督(从而执行):在均衡中没有规范会被违反。在其他情况下,我们表明,虽然不可能实现完美的执行,但我们可以任意接近;我们可以使均衡中违反规范的概率任意小。我们使用模拟表明,我们的理论结果适用于只有1000个代理的多代理系统-系统迅速收敛到确保监控所需的代币令牌的稳态分布,然后保持接近稳态。
英文摘要:
We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents---the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.
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