交替博弈的专制策略
Autocratic strategies for alternating games
摘要:
重复博弈在行为科学和进化生物学中有着悠久的传统。最近,研究人员发现,通过让参与者单方面对收益施加线性约束,可以对重复的互动进行前所未有的控制。在这里,我们扩展这个理论的“零决定因素”(或更一般地说,“专制”)的战略交替游戏,这往往是生物学上更相关的比传统的同步游戏。交替博弈自然会导致参与者之间的不对称,因为第一步很重要,或者因为参与者可能不会以相等的概率移动。在两个局中人$X$和$Y$的严格交替对策中,当(i)$X$先行动和(ii)$Y$先行动时,我们给出了局中人$X$存在专制策略的条件.此外,我们表明,专制的战略存在,甚至(iii)游戏随机交替移动。专制策略中特别重要的一类是勒索策略和慷慨策略,它们分别为对手带来不利和有利的结果。我们使用连续捐赠博弈来说明这些策略,在该博弈中,玩家根据连续的合作投资水平来支付成本以向对手提供利益。由于交替移动的不对称性很容易从优势等级中产生,我们表明,它们可以赋予下级玩家比主导玩家更专制的策略。
英文摘要:
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of "zero-determinant" (or, more generally, "autocratic") strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games naturally result in asymmetries between players because the first move matters or because players might not move with equal probabilities. In a strictly-alternating game with two players, $X$ and $Y$, we give conditions for the existence of autocratic strategies for player $X$ when (i) $X$ moves first and (ii) $Y$ moves first. Furthermore, we show that autocratic strategies exist even for (iii) games with randomly-alternating moves. Particularly important categories of autocratic strategies are extortionate and generous strategies, which enforce unfavorable and favorable outcomes for the opponent, respectively. We illustrate these strategies using the continuous Donation Game, in which a player pays a cost to provide a benefit to the opponent according to a continuous cooperative investment level. Asymmetries due to alternating moves could easily arise from dominance hierarchies, and we show that they can endow subordinate players with more autocratic strategies than dominant players.
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