基于网络的评级系统及其对贿赂的抵制
A network-based rating system and its resistance to bribery
摘要：
我们研究一个评级系统，其中一组个人（例如，餐馆的顾客）评估给定的服务（例如餐馆），他们的综合意见确定所有个人使用该服务的概率以及由此产生的收入。我们明确的影响关系的社会网络模型，与个人受到他们信任的同行的评价。最重要的是，我们允许恶意服务提供商（例如，餐馆老板）贿赂一些个人，即，将其预期收入的一部分投资于修改其意见，从而影响其最终收益。我们分析了在各种约束条件下贿赂策略的效果，并展示了在什么条件下该系统是防贿赂的，即，任何贿赂策略都不会给服务提供商带来严格的正预期收益。
英文摘要：
We study a rating system in which a set of individuals (e.g., the customers of a restaurant) evaluate a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their aggregated opinion determining the probability of all individuals to use the service and thus its generated revenue. We explicitly model the influence relation by a social network, with individuals being influenced by the evaluation of their trusted peers. On top of that we allow a malicious service provider (e.g., the restaurant owner) to bribe some individuals, i.e., to invest a part of his or her expected income to modify their opinion, therefore influencing his or her final gain. We analyse the effect of bribing strategies under various constraints, and we show under what conditions the system is bribery-proof, i.e., no bribing strategy yields a strictly positive expected gain to the service provider.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
