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跨层分布式功率控制:一种提高总能量效率的重复博弈方法

Cross-layer distributed power control: A repeated games formulation to improve the sum energy-efficiency

Mariem Mhiri, Vineeth S. Varma, Karim Cheikhrouhou, Samson Lasaulce, Abdelaziz Samet

摘要:

这项工作的主要目标是提高能源效率(EE)的多址信道(MAC)系统,通过功率控制,在分布式方式。与许多现有的工作,能源效率的功率控制,忽略了可能存在的队列在发射机,我们考虑了一个新的广义跨层EE度量。当发射机具有非零能量成本时,甚至当辐射功率为零时,这种方法是相关的,并且考虑到有限分组缓冲器的存在和分组到达发射机。由于纳什均衡(NE)是一个能源效率低下的解决方案,目前的工作旨在克服这一赤字,提高全球能源效率。事实上,由于所考虑的系统有多个机构,每个机构都有自己的利益,反映每个决策者个人利益的性能指标是全球能源效率,然后定义为个人能源效率的总和。重复游戏(RG)的研究,通过研究两个动态游戏(有限RG和折扣RG),其平衡时定义了一个新的操作点(OP),帕累托支配的NE和依赖于个人的信道状态信息(CSI)。在此基础上,建立了有限RG(FRG)博弈的最小阶段数和折扣RG(DRG)的最大折扣因子的封闭表达式. RG公式中的跨层模型导致即使对于更高数量的用户也实现FRG中的最小阶段数量更短。此外,当用户数量增加时,跨层模型DRG中的社会福利(效用之和)略有下降,而Goodman模型显著降低。最后,我们表明,在实际系统中的随机分组到达,跨层功率控制算法优于古德曼算法。

英文摘要:

The main objective of this work is to improve the energy-efficiency (EE) of a multiple access channel (MAC) system, through power control, in a distributed manner. In contrast with many existing works on energy-efficient power control, which ignore the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter, we consider a new generalized cross-layer EE metric. This approach is relevant when the transmitters have a non-zero energy cost even when the radiated power is zero and takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer and packet arrival at the transmitter. As the Nash equilibrium (NE) is an energy-inefficient solution, the present work aims at overcoming this deficit by improving the global energy-efficiency. Indeed, as the considered system has multiple agencies each with their own interest, the performance metric reflecting the individual interest of each decision maker is the global energy-efficiency defined then as the sum over individual energy-efficiencies. Repeated games (RG) are investigated through the study of two dynamic games (finite RG and discounted RG), whose equilibrium is defined when introducing a new operating point (OP), Pareto-dominating the NE and relying only on individual channel state information (CSI). Accordingly, closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages of the game for finite RG (FRG) and the maximum discount factor of the discounted RG (DRG) were established. The cross-layer model in the RG formulation leads to achieving a shorter minimum number of stages in the FRG even for higher number of users. In addition, the social welfare (sum of utilities) in the DRG decreases slightly with the cross-layer model when the number of users increases while it is reduced considerably with the Goodman model. Finally, we show that in real systems with random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the Goodman algorithm.

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