一个平均场博弈经济增长模型
A mean-field game economic growth model
摘要:
在这里,我们研究了一个平均场游戏(MFG),模型的非合作的理性代理人的人口的经济增长。在这个MFG中,代理人被描述为两个状态变量-他们拥有的资本和消费品。每一个代理人都试图通过考虑总人口的统计数据来最大限度地利用自己的效用。个体行为驱动参与者的进化,市场出清条件决定资本和消费品的相对价格。我们研究了代理商的最优策略的存在性和唯一性,并发展了计算这些策略和均衡价格的数值方法。
英文摘要:
Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own. Each agent seeks to maximize their utility by taking into account statistical data of the total population. The individual actions drive the evolution of the players, and a market-clearing condition determines the relative price of capital and consumer goods. We study the existence and uniqueness of optimal strategies of the agents and develop numerical methods to compute these strategies and the equilibrium price.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。