通常比建设性案例更难：CP网络中的破坏性贿赂
Often harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
摘要：
我们研究的复杂性，破坏性的贿赂问题-外部代理人试图阻止一个不喜欢的候选人赢得贿赂行动-在投票组合域，其中的候选人集是笛卡尔产品的几个问题。这个问题与选举获胜幅度的概念有关，这是衡量选举结果稳健性的一个尺度，在电子投票中起着重要作用。在我们的设置中，选民有条件的偏好分配给这些问题，由CP网建模。我们解决这个问题的所有组合的复杂性的基础上区分四个投票规则，五个成本计划，三个贿赂行为，加权和未加权的选民，以及负面和非负面的情况。我们发现，几乎所有这些情况下是NP-完全或NP-难的加权投票，而大约一半的情况下，可以解决在多项式时间的非加权投票。
英文摘要：
We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem---an external agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions---in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the Cartesian product of several issues. This problem is related to the concept of the margin of victory of an election which constitutes a measure of robustness of the election outcome and plays an important role in the context of electronic voting. In our setting, voters have conditional preferences over assignments to these issues, modelled by CP-nets. We settle the complexity of all combinations of this problem based on distinctions of four voting rules, five cost schemes, three bribery actions, weighted and unweighted voters, as well as the negative and the non-negative scenario. We show that almost all of these cases are NP-complete or NP-hard for weighted votes while approximately half of the cases can be solved in polynomial time for unweighted votes.
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