基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves机制的能源市场反垄断规制方法
Antimonopoly regulation method in energy markets based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
摘要：
我们评估了通用的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves（VCG）机制作为反垄断措施对利润最大化的生产商的适用性，在集中的两个结算能源市场的发电机组的市场力操作的投资组合。生产商在其报价中不仅可以指出改变的费用函数，而且可以指出其发电机组的技术参数的扭曲值，这些扭曲值进入集中调度最优化问题的系统范围的约束。为了确保VCG方法在这种情况下的适用性，我们确定了一个额外的假设上的变化的可行集的集中调度最优化问题引起的生产者的技术参数的变化。在一般的VCG机制的框架下，我们提出了一个反垄断监管方法的基础上，监管机构估计的生产者的真实报价。如果这一估计是准确的，那么生产商的最大利润与不采取反垄断措施的真实投标情况下的最大利润相一致。如果估计是不准确的，误差既不影响生产者的（弱）主导出价，也不影响其最佳节点产量，但表现在总的提升支付。这确保了以最佳产出/消费计划的形式进行的有效分配，并使（上涨前的）市场价格免受生产者市场力量的影响。我们比较了建议的方法与替代的反垄断监管方法的基础上，由监管机构组成的投标取代生产者的出价。
英文摘要：
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement energy market. The producer may indicate in its bid not only the altered cost function but also the distorted values of the technical parameters of its generating units, which enter the system-wide constraints of the centralized dispatch optimization problem. To ensure the applicability of the VCG method in this setting, we identify an additional assumption on the changes of the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem induced by variations of the producer's technical parameters. In the framework of the generic VCG mechanism, we propose an antimonopoly regulation method based on a regulator estimate of the producer's truthful bid. If this estimate is exact, the producer's maximum profit coincides with that in the case of the truthful bidding when no antimonopoly measure is applied. If the estimate is not exact, the error affects neither the producer's (weakly) dominant bid nor its optimal nodal output but manifests itself in the total uplift payment. This ensures an efficient allocation in the form of the optimal output/consumption schedule and shields the (pre-uplift) market prices from the producer's market power. We compare the suggested method with the alternative antimonopoly regulation approach based on the replacement of the producer's bid by a bid composed by the regulator.
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