一个博弈论框架用于在存在拜占庭节点时的最优决策融合
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Optimum Decision Fusion in the Presence of Byzantines
AI总结:
本文提出一个博弈论框架,用于在存在恶意节点时实现最优决策融合,通过减少对先验知识的需求来提升数据融合精度。
摘要:
在存在恶意节点(通常称为拜占庭节点)的情况下,最优决策融合受到必须精确了解拜占庭节点统计行为的限制。通过聚焦于一个简单但广泛研究的场景,即融合中心(FC)需要根据本地节点可能被篡改的决策做出二元决策,我们提出一个博弈论框架,允许利用最优决策融合的优越性能,同时限制所需的先验知识量。我们首先假设了解拜占庭节点的统计行为来推导最优决策策略。然后通过将问题转化为博弈论框架,使FC试图猜测拜占庭节点的行为,而拜占庭节点必须固定其篡改策略而不了解FC的猜测。我们通过数值模拟推导博弈的均衡,从而确定FC和拜占庭节点的最优行为,并评估在均衡点可实现的性能。我们分析了多种不同设置,证明在所有情况下,所提出的解决方案都能提高数据融合的准确性。我们还显示,在某些情况下,拜占庭节点最小化观测系统状态与提交给FC的报告之间的互信息,比之前工作中假设的总是翻转本地节点的决策更优。
英文摘要:
Optimum decision fusion in the presence of malicious nodes - often referred to as Byzantines - is hindered by the necessity of exactly knowing the statistical behavior of Byzantines. By focusing on a simple, yet widely studied, set-up in which a Fusion Center (FC) is asked to make a binary decision about a sequence of system states by relying on the possibly corrupted decisions provided by local nodes, we propose a game-theoretic framework which permits to exploit the superior performance provided by optimum decision fusion, while limiting the amount of a-priori knowledge required. We first derive the optimum decision strategy by assuming that the statistical behavior of the Byzantines is known. Then we relax such an assumption by casting the problem into a game-theoretic framework in which the FC tries to guess the behavior of the Byzantines, which, in turn, must fix their corruption strategy without knowing the guess made by the FC. We use numerical simulations to derive the equilibrium of the game, thus identifying the optimum behavior for both the FC and the Byzantines, and to evaluate the achievable performance at the equilibrium. We analyze several different setups, showing that in all cases the proposed solution permits to improve the accuracy of data fusion. We also show that, in some instances, it is preferable for the Byzantines to minimize the mutual information between the status of the observed system and the reports submitted to the FC, rather than always flipping the decision made by the local nodes as it is customarily assumed in previous works.
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