汇编代码抗功耗分析的形式证明安全性--以平衡逻辑为例
Formally Proved Security of Assembly Code Against Power Analysis: A Case Study on Balanced Logic
摘要:
在他在CHES 2004的主题演讲中,Kocher主张侧信道攻击是一个例子,说明正式的密码学并不像人们认为的那样安全,因为一些假设(例如,在计算期间没有辅助信息可用)没有被建模。这种失败是由形式化方法关注模型而不是实现造成的。在本文中,我们提出了形式化的方法和工具,设计保护代码,并证明其安全性的权力分析。这些正式的方法避免了模型和实现之间的差异,工作在后者,而不是一个高层次的模型。事实上,我们的方法允许我们(a)自动插入一个功率平衡对策直接在汇编级,并证明诱导的代码转换的正确性;和(b)证明所获得的代码是平衡的一个合理的泄漏模型。我们还展示了如何描述硬件的特征,以使用最大化模型相关性的资源。实现我们的方法的工具,然后证明在一个案例研究中的8位AVR单片机,我们产生了一个可证明的保护目前的实施,揭示了至少250倍以上的抵抗CPA攻击。
英文摘要:
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during the computation) were not modeled. This failure is caused by formal methods' focus on models rather than implementations. In this paper we present formal methods and tools for designing protected code and proving its security against power analysis. These formal methods avoid the discrepancy between the model and the implementation by working on the latter rather than on a high-level model. Indeed, our methods allow us (a) to automatically insert a power balancing countermeasure directly at the assembly level, and to prove the correctness of the induced code transformation; and (b) to prove that the obtained code is balanced with regard to a reasonable leakage model. We also show how to characterize the hardware to use the resources which maximize the relevancy of the model. The tools implementing our methods are then demonstrated in a case study on an 8-bit AVR smartcard for which we generate a provably protected present implementation that reveals to be at least 250 times more resistant to CPA attacks.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。