欲望与不完全偏好的诞生
Desirability and the birth of incomplete preferences
摘要:
我们建立一个等价的两个看似不同的理论:一个是传统的公理化的不完全偏好的基础上的混合物独立公理的马彩票;另一个是理想的赌博理论的背景下,不精确的概率。这种等价性使我们能够从合意性的观点出发,并通过所衍生的连贯的下视概念,重新审视不完全偏好。在此基础上,我们得到了新的结果和见解:特别地,我们证明了不完全偏好理论可以在只存在最坏行为的假设下发展,而不需要最好行为,并且一个弱化的阿基米德公理也是足够的;这一公理也使我们能够解决一些关于正则性假设的争论(概率应该是正的--它们不一定是正的),这也使我们能够处理不可数的可能性空间;我们表明,它总是有可能以最小的方式扩展一个偏好关系到一个最坏的行为,然而,所产生的关系从来不是阿基米德,除了在一个平凡的情况下,我们表明,传统的概念,国家独立性与概念称为强独立性的不精确概率-这导致我们给一个弱得多的定义国家独立性比传统的;我们重新整理并统一了完整偏好、信念、价值观的概念;我们认为阿基米德主义并没有捕捉到所有可以用预期效用集建模的问题,我们提供了一个新的概念,正好做到了这一点。也许最重要的是,我们认为,整个愿望是一个强大的和自然的设置模型,并与不完整的偏好,即使在非阿基米德的问题。这使我们认为,可取性,而不是偏好,应该是决策理论公理化基础上的原始概念。
英文摘要:
We establish an equivalence between two seemingly different theories: one is the traditional axiomatisation of incomplete preferences on horse lotteries based on the mixture independence axiom; the other is the theory of desirable gambles developed in the context of imprecise probability. The equivalence allows us to revisit incomplete preferences from the viewpoint of desirability and through the derived notion of coherent lower previsions. On this basis, we obtain new results and insights: in particular, we show that the theory of incomplete preferences can be developed assuming only the existence of a worst act---no best act is needed---, and that a weakened Archimedean axiom suffices too; this axiom allows us also to address some controversy about the regularity assumption (that probabilities should be positive---they need not), which enables us also to deal with uncountable possibility spaces; we show that it is always possible to extend in a minimal way a preference relation to one with a worst act, and yet the resulting relation is never Archimedean, except in a trivial case; we show that the traditional notion of state independence coincides with the notion called strong independence in imprecise probability---this leads us to give much a weaker definition of state independence than the traditional one; we rework and uniform the notions of complete preferences, beliefs, values; we argue that Archimedeanity does not capture all the problems that can be modelled with sets of expected utilities and we provide a new notion that does precisely that. Perhaps most importantly, we argue throughout that desirability is a powerful and natural setting to model, and work with, incomplete preferences, even in case of non-Archimedean problems. This leads us to suggest that desirability, rather than preference, should be the primitive notion at the basis of decision-theoretic axiomatisations.
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