图形水印
Graph Watermarks
摘要:
从网络拓扑到在线社交网络,当今许多最敏感的数据集都可以在大型图表中捕获。这些数据集的所有者面临的一个重大挑战是如何与合作者和授权用户共享敏感图,例如与网络设备供应商共享网络拓扑,或与学术合作者共享Facebook的社交图。目前的工具可以提供有限的节点或边缘隐私,但需要修改的图形,显着降低其效用。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种新的替代形式的图形水印。图水印是为给定的图数据集、安全图密钥和安全用户密钥量身定制的小图。为了与合作者C共享敏感图G,所有者使用G、图密钥和C的密钥作为输入来生成水印图W,并将W嵌入G中以形成G '。如果G'是由C泄漏的,则其所有者可以可靠地确定为C生成的水印W是否实际上驻留在G'内部,从而证明C对泄漏负责。图形水印既可以作为防止数据泄漏的威慑手段,也可以作为泄漏后的追索方法。我们提供了强大的方案来创建,嵌入和提取水印,并使用大型,真实的图形分析和实验,以表明它们是唯一的,难以伪造。我们研究了图水印对单一和强大的合谋攻击者模型的鲁棒性,然后提出并实证评估机制,以显着提高弹性。
英文摘要:
From network topologies to online social networks, many of today's most sensitive datasets are captured in large graphs. A significant challenge facing owners of these datasets is how to share sensitive graphs with collaborators and authorized users, e.g. network topologies with network equipment vendors or Facebook's social graphs with academic collaborators. Current tools can provide limited node or edge privacy, but require modifications to the graph that significantly reduce its utility. In this work, we propose a new alternative in the form of graph watermarks. Graph watermarks are small graphs tailor-made for a given graph dataset, a secure graph key, and a secure user key. To share a sensitive graph G with a collaborator C, the owner generates a watermark graph W using G, the graph key, and C's key as input, and embeds W into G to form G'. If G' is leaked by C,its owner can reliably determine if the watermark W generated for C does in fact reside inside G', thereby proving C is responsible for the leak. Graph watermarks serve both as a deterrent against data leakage and a method of recourse after a leak. We provide robust schemes for creating, embedding and extracting watermarks, and use analysis and experiments on large, real graphs to show that they are unique and difficult to forge. We study the robustness of graph watermarks against both single and powerful colluding attacker models, then propose and empirically evaluate mechanisms to dramatically improve resilience.
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