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arXiv 1505.00396cs.ITmath.IT
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大规模MIMO中的物理层安全

Physical Layer Security in Massive MIMO

Y. Ozan Basciftci, C. Emre Koksal, Alexei Ashikhmin

摘要:

我们考虑一个单小区下行链路大规模MIMO通信中存在的对手能够干扰和窃听同时进行。我们表明,大规模MIMO通信是自然弹性的,没有训练阶段的干扰攻击,其中对手的干扰只有数据通信和窃听的数据通信和训练。具体来说,我们表明,安全的自由度(DoF)的存在下,这样的攻击达到的最大自由度是相同的。此外,我们评估了基站(BS)需要的天线数量,以建立信息理论的安全性,甚至不需要Wyner编码。接下来,我们展示了一旦对手开始干扰训练阶段,情况就完全不同了。具体来说,我们考虑一种攻击,称为训练阶段干扰,其中对手干扰和窃听的训练和数据通信。我们表明,在这样的攻击下,最大安全自由度等于零。此外,用户的最大可实现速率消失,即使在渐近制度中的BS天线的数量。为了应对这种攻击,我们开发了一种防御策略,在该策略中,我们使用一个秘密密钥来加密导频序列分配,以隐藏它们从对手,而不是加密数据。我们表明,如果基数的一组导频信号进行了适当的缩放,隐藏的对手的导频信号分配使用户能够实现安全的自由度,相同的最大可实现的自由度下没有攻击。最后,我们讨论了如何计算密码是一个合法的候选人隐藏导频信号分配。事实上,虽然密码学不能实现信息理论安全,但对手实现非零互信息泄漏率所需的计算能力达到无穷大。

英文摘要:

We consider a single-cell downlink massive MIMO communication in the presence of an adversary capable of jamming and eavesdropping simultaneously. We show that massive MIMO communication is naturally resilient to no training-phase jamming attack in which the adversary jams only the data communication and eavesdrops both the data communication and the training. Specifically, we show that the secure degrees of freedom (DoF) attained in the presence of such an attack is identical to the maximum DoF attained under no attack. Further, we evaluate the number of antennas that base station (BS) requires in order to establish information theoretic security without even a need for Wyner encoding. Next, we show that things are completely different once the adversary starts jamming the training phase. Specifically, we consider an attack, called training-phase jamming in which the adversary jams and eavesdrops both the training and the data communication. We show that under such an attack, the maximum secure DoF is equal to zero. Furthermore, the maximum achievable rates of users vanish even in the asymptotic regime in the number of BS antennas. To counter this attack, we develop a defense strategy in which we use a secret key to encrypt the pilot sequence assignments to hide them from the adversary, rather than encrypt the data. We show that, if the cardinality of the set of pilot signals are scaled appropriately, hiding the pilot signal assignments from the adversary enables the users to achieve secure DoF, identical to the maximum achievable DoF under no attack. Finally, we discuss how computational cryptography is a legitimate candidate to hide the pilot signal assignments. Indeed, while information theoretic security is not achieved with cryptography, the computational power necessary for the adversary to achieve a non-zero mutual information leakage rate goes to infinity.

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