arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1504.07070cs.OS
收藏

Deterland中确定性阻止定时攻击

Deterministically Deterring Timing Attacks in Deterland

Weiyi Wu, Bryan Ford

摘要:

体现当今云业务模型的大规模并行性和资源共享不仅加剧了定时通道的安全挑战,而且还破坏了基于资源分区的防御的可行性。我们提出了管理程序强制的时间缓解,以控制云环境中的时间通道。这种方法通过对客户机代码施加确定性的时间视图来关闭云内部的“参考时钟”,并使用时序缓解器来调整I/O的速度,并对外部观察者的潜在信息泄漏进行速率限制。我们的原型管理程序是第一个系统,以减轻全面的现有操作系统,如Linux和应用程序在任意语言的时间通道泄漏。缓解会导致不同的性能成本,具体取决于工作负载和可调的泄漏限制参数,但对于安全关键型云应用程序和数据来说,这种成本可能是合理的。

英文摘要:

The massive parallelism and resource sharing embodying today's cloud business model not only exacerbate the security challenge of timing channels, but also undermine the viability of defenses based on resource partitioning. We propose hypervisor-enforced timing mitigation to control timing channels in cloud environments. This approach closes "reference clocks" internal to the cloud by imposing a deterministic view of time on guest code, and uses timing mitigators to pace I/O and rate-limit potential information leakage to external observers. Our prototype hypervisor is the first system to mitigate timing-channel leakage across full-scale existing operating systems such as Linux and applications in arbitrary languages. Mitigation incurs a varying performance cost, depending on workload and tunable leakage-limiting parameters, but this cost may be justified for security-critical cloud applications and data.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑