速率缩放调度中汇聚能耗和服务质量的机制设计
Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling
摘要：
我们考虑一个战略游戏，玩家将任务提交给一台机器，该机器以最小化能量的方式执行所有任务，同时遵守给定的最后期限。然后以某种方式向玩家收取能量消耗。每个参与者都想最小化这个费用和他们工作的最后期限乘以优先权的总和。两个收费计划进行了研究，比例成本份额并不总是承认纯纳什均衡，和边际成本份额，它总是承认纯纳什均衡，在价格由一个恒定的因素过度收费。
英文摘要：
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
