隐私约束下的无根高斯树分类
Classifying Unrooted Gaussian Trees under Privacy Constraints
摘要:
在这项工作中,我们的目标是找出无根高斯树模型的拓扑和代数属性如何决定其安全鲁棒性,这是衡量我们提出的最大最小信息(MaMI)度量。这种度量量化了在窃听者攻击下两个合法节点之间通过公开讨论可提取的公共随机性的量。我们展示了一些一般的拓扑性质,所需的最大-最小的解决方案应满足。在这样的性质下,我们开发条件下,可比树放在一起,形成偏序集(偏序集)。每个偏序集包含最有利的结构作为偏序集的领导者,和最不利的结构。然后,我们为偏序集中的每棵树计算Tutte-like多项式,以便为偏序集中的任何树分配多项式。此外,我们提出了一种新的方法,基于限制整数划分,有效地枚举所有偏序集领导人。这些结果不仅有助于我们理解不同高斯树的安全强度,这在我们评估网络中各种联合高斯分布测量的信息泄漏问题时至关重要,而且还为我们掌握此类模型的一些基本性质提供了代数和拓扑视角。
英文摘要:
In this work, our objective is to find out how topological and algebraic properties of unrooted Gaussian tree models determine their security robustness, which is measured by our proposed max-min information (MaMI) metric. Such metric quantifies the amount of common randomness extractable through public discussion between two legitimate nodes under an eavesdropper attack. We show some general topological properties that the desired max-min solutions shall satisfy. Under such properties, we develop conditions under which comparable trees are put together to form partially ordered sets (posets). Each poset contains the most favorable structure as the poset leader, and the least favorable structure. Then, we compute the Tutte-like polynomial for each tree in a poset in order to assign a polynomial to any tree in a poset. Moreover, we propose a novel method, based on restricted integer partitions, to effectively enumerate all poset leaders. The results not only help us understand the security strength of different Gaussian trees, which is critical when we evaluate the information leakage issues for various jointly Gaussian distributed measurements in networks, but also provide us both an algebraic and a topological perspective in grasping some fundamental properties of such models.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。