在连续雪堆博弈中，欺骗与合作在进化上同化了
Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game
摘要：
众所周知，与囚徒困境相比，雪堆博弈可以导致合作者和欺骗者的稳定共存。最近关于雪堆游戏的理论证据表明，选择连续贡献的个体的逐渐进化可以通过所谓的进化分支导致社会多样化到100%贡献和0%贡献。然而，到目前为止，博弈论研究对进化动力学和策略多样性丧失的后果几乎没有什么启示。在这里，我们分析了二态种群中具有二次支付函数的连续雪堆游戏。随后，条件下，逐步进化可以导致人口组成的100%的贡献和那些与0%的贡献合并成一个物种的中间贡献水平。关键的发现是，连续雪堆游戏更有可能导致同化不同的合作水平，而不是保持多样性。重要的是，这意味着允许合作行为的逐渐演变可以促进合资企业中的社会不公平规避，否则可能会导致基于普遍接受的公平概念的冲突。
英文摘要：
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.
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