网络民主中的投票行为与权力--对德国海盗党LiquidFeedback的研究
Voting Behaviour and Power in Online Democracy: A Study of LiquidFeedback in Germany's Pirate Party
摘要：
近年来，各政党采用了LiquidFeedback等在线代表民主平台，通过基层方法组织自己和政治议程。反对使用这些平台的一个共同的反对意见是委托系统，其中用户可以将其投票委托给另一个用户，从而产生所谓的超级投票者，即接受许多委托的强大用户。过去有人断言，这些超级选民的存在破坏了民主进程，因此应该避免代表民主。在这篇文章中，我们来看看德国海盗党运营的全球最大的代表性在线民主平台中超级选民的出现。我们系统地调查党内权力的分配，研究超级选民是否存在，并探讨他们对网上投票结果的影响。虽然我们发现超级选民的理论权力确实很高，但我们也观察到他们明智地使用他们的权力。超级选民并不完全行使他们改变投票结果的权力，但在许多情况下，他们投票赞成大多数选民的提案，从而对制度产生稳定作用。我们利用这些发现提出了一类新的权力指数，认为观察到的投票偏见，并给出了显着更好的预测比国家的最先进的措施。
英文摘要：
In recent years, political parties have adopted Online Delegative Democracy platforms such as LiquidFeedback to organise themselves and their political agendas via a grassroots approach. A common objection against the use of these platforms is the delegation system, where a user can delegate his vote to another user, giving rise to so-called super-voters, i.e. powerful users who receive many delegations. It has been asserted in the past that the presence of these super-voters undermines the democratic process, and therefore delegative democracy should be avoided. In this paper, we look at the emergence of super-voters in the largest delegative online democracy platform worldwide, operated by Germany's Pirate Party. We investigate the distribution of power within the party systematically, study whether super-voters exist, and explore the influence they have on the outcome of votings conducted online. While we find that the theoretical power of super-voters is indeed high, we also observe that they use their power wisely. Super-voters do not fully act on their power to change the outcome of votes, but they vote in favour of proposals with the majority of voters in many cases thereby exhibiting a stabilising effect on the system. We use these findings to present a novel class of power indices that considers observed voting biases and gives significantly better predictions than state-of-the-art measures.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
