arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1503.01539cs.GTcs.NI
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众包无线社区网络用户行为的博弈分析

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of User Behaviors in Crowdsourced Wireless Community Networks

Qian Ma, Lin Gao, Ya-Feng Liu, Jianwei Huang

摘要:

众包无线社区网络可通过鼓励个人(用户)彼此共享其私人住宅Wi-Fi接入点(AP)来有效地缓解Wi-Fi接入点(AP)的有限覆盖问题。本文首次研究了这种网络中用户的联合成员选择和网络接入问题。具体来说,我们制定的问题作为一个两阶段的动态游戏:第一阶段对应于一个会员选择游戏,其中每个用户选择他的会员类型;第二阶段对应于一组网络接入游戏,其中每个用户决定他的WiFi连接时间在AP在他的当前位置。系统地分析了子博弈完美均衡,研究了最佳反应动态是否以及如何达到子博弈完美均衡。通过数值研究,我们进一步探讨了如何平衡的变化与用户的移动模式和网络访问的评价。我们发现,一个用户更受欢迎的家庭位置,一个较小的旅行时间,或一个较小的网络访问评估更有可能选择一种特定类型的会员资格称为条例草案。在此基础上,我们进一步论证了网络运营商如何在博弈均衡分析的基础上优化其定价和激励机制。

英文摘要:

A crowdsourced wireless community network can effectively alleviate the limited coverage issue of Wi-Fi access points (APs), by encouraging individuals (users) to share their private residential Wi-Fi APs with each other. This paper presents the first study on the users' joint membership selection and network access problem in such a network. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-stage dynamic game: Stage I corresponds to a membership selection game, in which each user chooses his membership type; Stage II corresponds to a set of network access games, in each of which each user decides his WiFi connection time on the AP at his current location. We analyze the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) systematically, and study whether and how best response dynamics can reach the equilibrium. Through numerical studies, we further explore how the equilibrium changes with the users' mobility patterns and network access evaluations. We show that a user with a more popular home location, a smaller travel time, or a smaller network access evaluation is more likely to choose a specific type of membership called Bill. We further demonstrate how the network operator can optimize its pricing and incentive mechanism based on the game equilibrium analysis in this work.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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