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arXiv 1501.06558physics.soc-phcs.GTq-bio.PE
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定向学习与公共产品的提供

Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods

Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaz Perc

摘要:

我们考虑的环境中,参与者参与了一个公共产品的游戏,必须反复决定是否作出个人的贡献或没有。然而,参与者缺乏关于游戏和人口中其他参与者的战略相关信息。由此产生的行为的球员是完全解耦的,从这样的信息,和个人的策略调整动态驱动的强化反馈,从每个球员自己的过去。我们表明,由此产生的“定向学习”是足以解释合作偏离纳什均衡。我们引入了k-强均衡的概念,其中嵌套的纳什均衡和奥曼-强均衡作为两个特殊情况,我们表明,连同学习模型的参数,最大的k-强度的平衡确定的平稳分布。即使在不利条件下,只要参与者对自身收益的变化做出足够的反应并相应地调整自己的行动,公共产品的提供也是可以保证的。因此,大量的公共合作水平可以解释没有参数涉及无知或社会偏好,仅仅是在不协调的方向(错误)学习的基础上。

英文摘要:

We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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