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arXiv 1411.7472cs.GTcs.CCcs.DScs.SI
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时间不一致规划中的计算问题

Computational issues in time-inconsistent planning

Pingzhong Tang, Yifeng Teng, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Yichong Xu

摘要:

时间不一致是指决策过程中的一个悖论,即代理人随着时间的推移表现出不一致的行为。例如,代理人往往会昂贵地推迟简单的任务,而代理人则会启动计划并在中途退出。这些行为是不受欢迎的,因为代理人做出的决定显然不是最佳的。为了捕捉这些行为,更重要的是,为了量化这些行为造成的低效率,[Kleinberg & Oren 2014]提出了一个图模型,除了成本结构之外,它与标准规划模型基本相同。使用这个模型,他们开始研究几个有趣的问题:1)成本比:代理的实际成本与最优成本之间的最差比率,在所有图实例上; 2)激励子图:如何通过删除节点和边来激励代理达到目标; 3)中间奖励:如何通过放置中间奖励来激励代理达到目标。Kleinberg和Oren对这些问题给出了部分答案,但主要问题仍然是开放的。事实上,他们在论文中明确提出了这些问题。在本文中,我们给出了[Kleinberg & Oren 2014]中所有三个开放问题的答案。首先,我们给出了不具有Akerlof结构的图的成本比的一个紧上界,从而证实了Kleinberg和Oren的猜想,即Akerlof结构确实是成本比的最坏情况。其次,我们证明了找到一个激励子图是NP-困难的,表明它通常是低效的激励代理删除节点和边的图。最后但并非最不重要的是,我们表明,计算一个战略,把最小数额的总奖励也是NP-难的。因此,通过设置中间奖励来激励代理是计算效率低下的。我们用来证明这些结果的技术是不平凡的和独立的利益。

英文摘要:

Time-inconsistency refers to a paradox in decision making where agents exhibit inconsistent behaviors over time. Examples are procrastination where agents tends to costly postpone easy tasks, and abandonments where agents start a plan and quit in the middle. These behaviors are undesirable in the sense that agents make clearly suboptimal decisions over optimal ones. To capture such behaviors and more importantly, to quantify inefficiency caused by such behaviors, [Kleinberg & Oren 2014] propose a graph model which is essentially same as the standard planning model except for the cost structure. Using this model, they initiate the study of several interesting problems: 1) cost ratio: the worst ratio between the actual cost of the agent and the optimal cost, over all graph instances; 2) motivating subgraph: how to motivate the agent to reach the goal by deleting nodes and edges; 3) Intermediate rewards: how to motivate agents to reach the goal by placing intermediate rewards. Kleinberg and Oren give partial answers to these questions, but the main problems are still open. In fact, they raise these problems explicitly as open problems in their paper. In this paper, we give answers to all three open problems in [Kleinberg & Oren 2014]. First, we show a tight upper bound of cost ratio for graphs without Akerlof's structure, thus confirm the conjecture by Kleinberg and Oren that Akerlof's structure is indeed the worst case for cost ratio. Second, we prove that finding a motivating subgraph is NP-hard, showing that it is generally inefficient to motivate agents by deleting nodes and edges in the graph. Last but not least, we show that computing a strategy to place minimum amount of total reward is also NP-hard. Therefore, it is computational inefficient to motivate agents by placing intermediate rewards. The techniques we use to prove these results are nontrivial and of independent interests.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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