Sprobes:在TrustZone体系结构上强制执行内核代码完整性
Sprobes: Enforcing Kernel Code Integrity on the TrustZone Architecture
摘要:
许多智能手机现在部署传统的操作系统,所以在桌面和服务器系统上如此普遍的rootkit攻击现在对智能手机构成了威胁。虽然研究人员提倡使用虚拟化来检测和防止对操作系统的攻击(例如,VM内省和可信虚拟域),由于缺乏虚拟化支持和/或虚拟化的费用,虚拟化在智能手机系统上是不切实际的。当前的智能电话处理器确实具有用于运行受保护环境的硬件支持,诸如ARM TrustZone扩展,但是这样的硬件不足以控制操作系统操作以使能VM自省。特别地,与TrustZone一起运行的常规操作系统仍然保留对存储管理的完全控制,rootkit可以使用该完全控制来防止有效内省所必需的敏感指令或存储器访问上的陷阱。在本文中,我们提出了SPROBES,一种新的原语,使运行在ARM TrustZone硬件上的操作系统的内省。使用SPROBES,受TrustZone保护的内省机制可以检测其选择的各个操作系统指令,每当执行任何SPROBE时都会接收不可伪造的陷阱。设计SPROBES的关键挑战是防止rootkit删除它们,但我们确定了一组五个不变量,其执行足以限制rootkit只执行批准,SPROBE注入内核代码。我们为ARM Fast Models仿真器实现了SPROBES的概念验证版本,证明在Linux内核2.6.38中,只有12个SPROBES就足以强制执行所有五个不变量。使用SPROBES,我们可以利用有限的TrustZone扩展来限制常规内核执行到全面批准的代码。
英文摘要:
Many smartphones now deploy conventional operating systems, so the rootkit attacks so prevalent on desktop and server systems are now a threat to smartphones. While researchers have advocated using virtualization to detect and prevent attacks on operating systems (e.g., VM introspection and trusted virtual domains), virtualization is not practical on smartphone systems due to the lack of virtualization support and/or the expense of virtualization. Current smartphone processors do have hardware support for running a protected environment, such as the ARM TrustZone extensions, but such hardware does not control the operating system operations sufficiently to enable VM introspection. In particular, a conventional operating system running with TrustZone still retains full control of memory management, which a rootkit can use to prevent traps on sensitive instructions or memory accesses necessary for effective introspection. In this paper, we present SPROBES, a novel primitive that enables introspection of operating systems running on ARM TrustZone hardware. Using SPROBES, an introspection mechanism protected by TrustZone can instrument individual operating system instructions of its choice, receiving an unforgeable trap whenever any SPROBE is executed. The key challenge in designing SPROBES is preventing the rootkit from removing them, but we identify a set of five invariants whose enforcement is sufficient to restrict rootkits to execute only approved, SPROBE-injected kernel code. We implemented a proof-of-concept version of SPROBES for the ARM Fast Models emulator, demonstrating that in Linux kernel 2.6.38, only 12 SPROBES are sufficient to enforce all five of these invariants. With SPROBES we show that it is possible to leverage the limited TrustZone extensions to limit conventional kernel execution to approved code comprehensively.
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