众筹者隐私偏好的隐藏成本:一个随机现场实验
The Hidden Cost of Accommodating Crowdfunder Privacy Preferences: A Randomized Field Experiment
摘要:
在线众筹作为一种有希望的促进创业和创新的途径,受到了企业家和决策者的极大关注。从离线到在线设置的这种转变的一个值得注意的方面是,它提高了交易的可见性和可追溯性。因此,许多众筹平台提供了使活动贡献者能够向同行隐藏他或她的身份或贡献金额的机制。我们研究这些信息(隐私)控制机制对众筹行为的影响。在最大的在线众筹平台之一进行随机实验,我们发现了两种积极的证据(例如,舒适性)和负面(例如,隐私启动)的因果效应。我们发现,减少对信息控制的访问会导致筹款的净增加,但这一结果来自两个相互竞争的影响:治疗增加了参与平台的意愿(贡献概率增加4.9%),同时降低了平均贡献(5.81美元下降)。这种下降源于公众效应,其中贡献者通过缓和极端贡献来应对缺乏隐私。我们解开了驱动结果的因果机制,并讨论了我们的研究结果对在线平台设计的影响。
英文摘要:
Online crowdfunding has received a great deal of attention from entrepreneurs and policymakers as a promising avenue to fostering entrepreneurship and innovation. A notable aspect of this shift from an offline to an online setting is that it brings increased visibility and traceability of transactions. Many crowdfunding platforms therefore provide mechanisms that enable a campaign contributor to conceal his or her identity or contribution amount from peers. We study the impact of these information (privacy) control mechanisms on crowdfunder behavior. Employing a randomized experiment at one of the largest online crowdfunding platforms, we find evidence of both positive (e.g., comfort) and negative (e.g., privacy priming) causal effects. We find that reducing access to information controls induces a net increase in fundraising, yet this outcome results from two competing influences: treatment increases willingness to engage with the platform (a 4.9% increase in the probability of contribution) and simultaneously decreases the average contribution (a $5.81 decline). This decline derives from a publicity effect, wherein contributors respond to a lack of privacy by tempering extreme contributions. We unravel the causal mechanisms that drive the results and discuss the implications of our findings for the design of online platforms.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。