多人多策略进化博弈中均衡点的期望数
On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game
摘要:
本文分析了一般的$d$ -局中人$n$ -策略演化博弈中内部均衡的平均数$E(n,d)$,其中代理人的收益服从正态分布.首先,我们给出了一般情况下的计算可实现的公式。接下来,我们描述的渐近行为的$E(2,d)$,估计其下限和上界的$d$增加。从这一分析中得出两个重要结论。一方面,我们表明,在这两种情况下,看到的最大可能数量的均衡趋于零时,$d$或$n$分别走向无穷大的概率。另一方面,我们证明了稳定平衡点的期望个数在一定的区间内是有界的。最后,对于较大的$n$和$d$,数值结果提供和讨论。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we analyze the mean number $E(n,d)$ of internal equilibria in a general $d$-player $n$-strategy evolutionary game where the agents' payoffs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable formula for the general case. Next we characterize the asymptotic behavior of $E(2,d)$, estimating its lower and upper bounds as $d$ increases. Two important consequences are obtained from this analysis. On the one hand, we show that in both cases the probability of seeing the maximal possible number of equilibria tends to zero when $d$ or $n$ respectively goes to infinity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that the expected number of stable equilibria is bounded within a certain interval. Finally, for larger $n$ and $d$, numerical results are provided and discussed.
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