拜占庭数据下分布式贝叶斯检测的渐近分析
Asymptotic Analysis of Distributed Bayesian Detection with Byzantine Data
摘要:
在这封信中,我们考虑的问题,分布式贝叶斯检测的数据伪造拜占庭在网络中的存在。分布式检测的问题被制定为一个二进制假设检验在融合中心(FC)的基础上发送的传感器的1位数据。采用自相关信息作为性能度量,研究了系统在拜占庭攻击下的检测性能。得到了拜占庭人致盲FC所需的最小攻击力的表达式。更具体地说,我们表明,在一定比例的拜占庭攻击者在网络中,检测方案变得完全无法利用传感器数据进行检测。当拜占庭的分数是不足以盲目的FC,我们也提供了封闭形式的表达式的最佳攻击策略的拜占庭,最降低检测性能。
英文摘要:
In this letter, we consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection in the presence of data falsifying Byzantines in the network. The problem of distributed detection is formulated as a binary hypothesis test at the fusion center (FC) based on 1-bit data sent by the sensors. Adopting Chernoff information as our performance metric, we study the detection performance of the system under Byzantine attack in the asymptotic regime. The expression for minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the FC is obtained. More specifically, we show that above a certain fraction of Byzantine attackers in the network, the detection scheme becomes completely incapable of utilizing the sensor data for detection. When the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the FC, we also provide closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most degrade the detection performance.
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