准时到达达米特家
On Time chez Dummett
摘要：
我讨论了达米特关于时间和物理学哲学方面的著作之间的三个联系。第一个联系（第2节）来自达米特关于观察与时间和空间的不同关系的评论。主要观点是无可争议的，同样适用于经典物理和量子物理。它涉及到这样一个事实，即与宏观物体改变其可观察属性的典型时间尺度相比，感知处理是如此之快，以至于它产生了一个“共同的现在”的想法，遍布空间。另外两种联系是量子理论特有的，按照埃弗雷特的思路来解释。所以对于这两种联系，物理学方面是有争议的，就像哲学方面一样。在第3节中，我将多元宇宙的埃弗雷特“分裂”之前的主观不确定性与Dummett的建议联系起来，受到McTaggart的启发，即对时间现实的完整的，即无索引的描述是不可能的。在第4节中，我将Barthel对时间是真实的否认--沿着Everett的路线进行否认，而不是McTaggart--与Dummett的建议相联系，即关于过去的陈述不是确定的真或假，因为它们不是有效的决定。
英文摘要：
I discuss three connections between Dummett's writings about time and philosophical aspects of physics. The first connection (Section 2) arises from remarks of Dummett's about the different relations of observation to time and to space. The main point is uncontroversial and applies equally to classical and quantum physics. It concerns the fact that perceptual processing is so rapid, compared with the typical time-scale on which macroscopic objects change their observable properties, that it engenders the idea of a 'common now', spread across space. The other two connections are specific to quantum theory, as interpreted along the lines of Everett. So for these two connections, the physics side is controversial, just as the philosophical side is. In Section 3, I connect the subjective uncertainty before an Everettian 'splitting' of the multiverse to Dummett's suggestion, inspired by McTaggart, that a complete, i.e. indexical-free description of a temporal reality is impossible. And in Section 4, I connect Barbour's denial that time is real---a denial along the lines of Everett, rather than McTaggart---to Dummett's suggestion that statements about the past are not determinately true or false, because they are not effectively decidable.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
