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arXiv 1405.4102q-bio.PE
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圈和完全图上的可选博弈

Optional games on cycles and complete graphs

Hyeong-Chai Jeong, Seung-Yoon Oh, Benjamin Allen, Martin A. Nowak

摘要:

本文研究简单图上可选对策的随机演化。有两种策略,A和B,它们的相互作用由一个一般的收益矩阵描述。此外,还有一种或几种可能性可以通过采取孤独者策略来退出游戏。可选择的游戏导致轻松的社会困境。在这里,我们探讨空间结构和可选游戏之间的相互作用。我们发现,增加孤独的战略(或相当于增加对孤独的战略突变的偏见)的数量有利于发展的合作,在良好的混合和结构化的人口。我们得到各种限制弱选择和大的人口规模。在某些情况下,我们推导出强选择的解析结果。我们还分析了有限选择强度的策略选择数值和讨论的可选性和空间结构的综合影响。

英文摘要:

We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas. Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games. We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increasing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial structure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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