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arXiv 1404.6822cs.CR
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vVote:一个可验证的投票系统

vVote: a Verifiable Voting System

Chris Culnane, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Vanessa Teague

摘要:

Pret a Voter加密投票系统设计灵活,为选民提供熟悉和简单的投票体验。在本文中,我们提出了一个案例研究,我们的努力,以适应Pret的选民在澳大利亚维多利亚州的选举特质。本技术报告包括一般背景、用户体验以及加密协议和人工过程的详细信息。我们解释了问题,提出了解决方案,然后分析了它们的安全属性,并解释了它们如何与其他设计决策相结合。我们希望这将是一个有趣的案例研究的应用端到端的可验证的投票协议,真正的选举。本文的初步版本作为2014年2月10日版本的“VEC vVote系统技术报告草案”出现。参与开发vVote设计的团队包括:Craig Burton、Chris Culnane、James Heather、Rui Joaquim、Peter Y。A.瑞恩,史蒂夫·施耐德和瓦内萨·蒂格.

英文摘要:

The Pret a Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Pret a Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria. This technical report includes general background, user experience and details of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyse their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions. We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections. A preliminary version of this paper appeared as the 10th February 2014 version of "Draft Technical Report for VEC vVote System". The team involved in developing the vVote design described in this report were: Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Rui Joaquim, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider and Vanessa Teague.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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