认知无线电网络中的分布式信道分配:稳定匹配与瓦尔拉斯均衡
Distributed Channel Assignment in Cognitive Radio Networks: Stable Matching and Walrasian Equilibrium
摘要:
我们考虑一组二次发射机-接收机对在认知无线电设置。基于信道感知和接入性能,我们考虑了通过分布式协调和协作算法向次用户正交分配信道的问题。两个经济模型适用于这一目的:匹配市场和竞争市场。在匹配市场模型中,二级用户和渠道商构建了两个代理集。我们实现了一个稳定的匹配算法,其中每个二级用户,根据他的可达到的速率,建议协调器匹配所需的信道。协调器基于取决于来自次级用户的干扰的信道偏好来接受或拒绝提议。该协调算法复杂度低,能适应网络动态特性.在竞争市场模型中,渠道与价格相关联,二级用户被赋予货币预算。每个二级用户,根据他的效用函数和当前的渠道价格,需要一组渠道。瓦尔拉斯均衡使总效用最大化,并使渠道需求与供应相等。我们证明了瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在性,并提出了一种合作机制来达到它,所提出的解决方案的性能和复杂性的数值模拟说明。
英文摘要:
We consider a set of secondary transmitter-receiver pairs in a cognitive radio setting. Based on channel sensing and access performances, we consider the problem of assigning channels orthogonally to secondary users through distributed coordination and cooperation algorithms. Two economic models are applied for this purpose: matching markets and competitive markets. In the matching market model, secondary users and channels build two agent sets. We implement a stable matching algorithm in which each secondary user, based on his achievable rate, proposes to the coordinator to be matched with desirable channels. The coordinator accepts or rejects the proposals based on the channel preferences which depend on interference from the secondary user. The coordination algorithm is of low complexity and can adapt to network dynamics. In the competitive market model, channels are associated with prices and secondary users are endowed with monetary budget. Each secondary user, based on his utility function and current channel prices, demands a set of channels. A Walrasian equilibrium maximizes the sum utility and equates the channel demand to their supply. We prove the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and propose a cooperative mechanism to reach it. The performance and complexity of the proposed solutions are illustrated by numerical simulations.
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