寻找树上竞争扩散的安全策略
Finding safe strategies for competitive diffusion on trees
摘要:
我们研究了两个玩家的竞争扩散,通过社会网络的技术或影响力的扩散博弈论模型的安全游戏。在博弈论中,安全策略是相对于对手的未知策略具有最小预期收益的混合策略。竞争扩散的安全策略在其他参与者不确定的情况下导致影响力的最大传播。我们研究了两个特定类别的树,蜘蛛和完全树的安全游戏,并给出了最小预期收益的紧界。然后,我们使用这些结果给出了一个算法,这表明一个安全的战略,任何树上的球员。我们测试这个算法的随机生成的树,并表明,它发现的战略是接近最优的。
英文摘要:
We study the two-player safe game of Competitive Diffusion, a game-theoretic model for the diffusion of technologies or influence through a social network. In game theory, safe strategies are mixed strategies with a minimal expected gain against unknown strategies of the opponents. Safe strategies for competitive diffusion lead to maximum spread of influence in the presence of uncertainty about the other players. We study the safe game on two specific classes of trees, spiders and complete trees, and give tight bounds on the minimal expected gain. We then use these results to give an algorithm which suggests a safe strategy for a player on any tree. We test this algorithm on randomly generated trees, and show that it finds strategies that are close to optimal.
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