可废止推理和概率推理的规范性说明
A normative account of defeasible and probabilistic inference
Max Planck Institute（马克斯·普朗克研究所）；University of São Paulo（圣保罗大学）
摘要：
本文进一步论证了逻辑推论应该从规范的角度来理解的观点。哈特里·菲尔德和约翰·麦克法兰讨论了经典案例。我们扩展了他们的工作，研究当面对不确定的信息或在非单调的，可废除的逻辑框架（允许e）内推理时，代理人被迫推断结论意味着什么。G.除非提出相反证据，否则不得从被视为真实的前提作出推论）。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we provide more evidence for the contention that logical consequence should be understood in normative terms. Hartry Field and John MacFarlane covered the classical case. We extend their work, examining what it means for an agent to be obliged to infer a conclusion when faced with uncertain information or reasoning within a non-monotonic, defeasible, logical framework (which allows e. g. for inference to be drawn from premises considered true unless evidence to the contrary is presented).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
