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arXiv 1401.4339cs.CRcs.PL
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WebKit的JavaScript字节码中的信息流控制

Information Flow Control in WebKit's JavaScript Bytecode

Abhishek Bichhawat, Vineet Rajani, Deepak Garg, Christian Hammer

摘要:

今天的网站通常会结合来自多个来源的JavaScript,包括可信和不可信的。因此,JavaScript的安全性至关重要。一个特别有趣的问题是JavaScript的信息流控制(IFC)。在本文中,我们开发,形式化和实现一个动态IFC机制的生产Web浏览器(特别是Safari的WebKit引擎)的JavaScript引擎。我们的IFC机制在JavaScript字节码级别工作,因此利用了多年来在优化源代码到字节码编译器和字节码解释器方面的工业努力。我们跟踪显式和隐式流,只观察到适度的开销。使用字节码会带来新的挑战,包括在字节码中广泛使用非结构化控制流(这使得降低程序上下文污染变得复杂)、非结构化异常(这使问题进一步复杂化)以及需要允许IFC分析。我们解释了我们如何解决这些挑战,正式建模的JavaScript字节码语义和我们的仪器,证明终止不敏感的非干扰的标准属性,并提出实验结果的优化原型。

英文摘要:

Websites today routinely combine JavaScript from multiple sources, both trusted and untrusted. Hence, JavaScript security is of paramount importance. A specific interesting problem is information flow control (IFC) for JavaScript. In this paper, we develop, formalize and implement a dynamic IFC mechanism for the JavaScript engine of a production Web browser (specifically, Safari's WebKit engine). Our IFC mechanism works at the level of JavaScript bytecode and hence leverages years of industrial effort on optimizing both the source to bytecode compiler and the bytecode interpreter. We track both explicit and implicit flows and observe only moderate overhead. Working with bytecode results in new challenges including the extensive use of unstructured control flow in bytecode (which complicates lowering of program context taints), unstructured exceptions (which complicate the matter further) and the need to make IFC analysis permissive. We explain how we address these challenges, formally model the JavaScript bytecode semantics and our instrumentation, prove the standard property of termination-insensitive non-interference, and present experimental results on an optimized prototype.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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