基于广义可加独立性的多属性拍卖
Multiattribute Auctions Based on Generalized Additive Independence
摘要:
我们开发多属性拍卖,以适应广义加法独立(GAI)的偏好。我们提出了一个迭代的拍卖机制,保持潜在的重叠GAI集群的属性的价格,从而减少启发和计算负担,并创建一个开放的竞争供应商之间的多维域。最重要的是,拍卖保证实现盈余,接近最优福利的一个小的附加因素,在合理的均衡策略的交易者。GAI拍卖与以往文献的主要区别是适应非加性交易者偏好,从而允许交易者根据其他属性的值对特定属性进行评估。同时,GAI结构支持价格的紧凑表示,从而实现易于处理的拍卖过程。我们进行了模拟研究,展示和量化的显着效率优势,更有表现力的偏好建模。我们绘制随机GAI结构的效用函数与各种内部结构,生成近似的GAI效用的添加剂功能,并比较使用两种表示的拍卖的性能。我们发现,允许交易者表达现有的属性之间的依赖关系,提高了多属性拍卖的经济效率。
英文摘要:
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes, thus decreases elicitation and computational burden, and creates an open competition among suppliers over a multidimensional domain. Most significantly, the auction is guaranteed to achieve surplus which approximates optimal welfare up to a small additive factor, under reasonable equilibrium strategies of traders. The main departure of GAI auctions from previous literature is to accommodate non-additive trader preferences, hence allowing traders to condition their evaluation of specific attributes on the value of other attributes. At the same time, the GAI structure supports a compact representation of prices, enabling a tractable auction process. We perform a simulation study, demonstrating and quantifying the significant efficiency advantage of more expressive preference modeling. We draw random GAI-structured utility functions with various internal structures, generate additive functions that approximate the GAI utility, and compare the performance of the auctions using the two representations. We find that allowing traders to express existing dependencies among attributes improves the economic efficiency of multiattribute auctions.
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