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arXiv 1401.3274cs.CR
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电网隐蔽攻击:最优攻击策略与防范

Hidden Attacks on Power Grid: Optimal Attack Strategies and Mitigation

Deepjyoti Deka, Ross Baldick, Sriram Vishwanath

摘要:

电网的实时的运行及其不同元件的同步性要求其状态变量的准确估计。状态估计中的错误将导致次优的最优潮流(OPF)解和随后的市场中的电力价格的增加,或者潜在地过载并造成线路中断。本文研究了电力系统的隐藏数据攻击的对手试图操纵状态估计。对手获得了几米的控制权,并能够在其中引入虚假测量。本文提出了一个多项式时间算法,使用最小割计算,以确定最小数量的测量对手需要操纵,以执行隐藏的攻击。贪婪的技术,以帮助系统操作员识别关键的保护措施,以防止这种隐藏的数据攻击。安全的PMU放置对数据攻击也进行了讨论,并为此目的开发了一个算法放置PMU。通过IEEE测试用例的模拟所提出的算法的性能。

英文摘要:

Real time operation of the power grid and synchronism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent increase in the price of electricity in the market or, potentially overload and create line outages. This paper studies hidden data attacks on power systems by an adversary trying to manipulate state estimators. The adversary gains control of a few meters, and is able to introduce spurious measurements in them. The paper presents a polynomial time algorithm using min-cut calculations to determine the minimum number of measurements an adversary needs to manipulate in order to perform a hidden attack. Greedy techniques are presented to aid the system operator in identifying critical measurements for protection to prevent such hidden data attacks. Secure PMU placement against data attacks is also discussed and an algorithm for placing PMUs for this purpose is developed. The performances of the proposed algorithms are shown through simulations on IEEE test cases.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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